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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF VEHICLE AUTOMATION LEVEL AND WARNING TYPE ON
RESPONSES TO VEHICLE HACKING
Wyatt D. McManus
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Jing Chen
Modern surface transportation vehicles often include different levels of automation.
Higher automation levels have the potential to impact surface transportation in unforeseen ways.
For example, connected vehicles with higher levels of automation are at a higher risk for hacking
attempts, because automated driving assistance systems often rely on onboard sensors and
internet connectivity. As the automation level of vehicle control rises, it is necessary to examine
the effect of different levels of automation have on the driver-vehicle interactions. In addition,
auditory warnings have been shown to effectively attract a driver’s attention while performing a
driving task, which is often visually demanding. The purpose of the current study was to
examine the effect of level of automation and warning type on the driver’s responses to vehicle
hacking attempts. This goal was accomplished by manipulating level of automation (manual vs.
automated) and warning type (non-semantic vs. semantic) and measuring drivers’ responses to a
vehicle hacking attempt using time to collision (TTC) values, maximum steering wheel angle,
number of successful responses, and other measures of response. Our results revealed no
significant effect of level of automation or warning type on TTC or successful response rate.
However, there was a significant effect of level of automation on maximum steering wheel angle
such that manual drivers had safer responses to the hacking attempt with smaller maximum
steering wheel angles. In addition, an effect of warning type that approached significance was
also found for maximum steering wheel angle such that participants who received a semantic
warning had more severe and dangerous responses to the hacking attempt. The current results

suggest that level of automation and warning type may not significantly affect how quickly
people respond to hacking scenarios when the warning is given in advance, but they may affect
the quality of the driver’s response. These findings are important to future vehicle system design
and subsequently the safety of future roadways.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The implementation of automated systems in modern surface transportation vehicles is an
ongoing process. Autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles are potentially extremely helpful
and safer than human operated vehicles (Nunes, Reimer, & Coughlin, 2018), but before
autonomous vehicles can be used there are risks and concerns that need researched and
understood. Research has been conducted examining the effect of different levels of vehicle
automation on the driver’s behavioral patterns (Gold, Damböck, Lorenz, & Bengler, 2013;
Merat, Jamson, Lai, & Carsten, 2012; Shen & Neyens, 2017; Strand, Nilsson, Karlsson, &
Nilsson, 2014). A vehicle hacking attempt, and the driver’s response, is an example of a modern
critical event that could change with the use of manual and automated driving technologies
(Amoozadeh et al., 2015; Strand et al., 2014). Malicious hacking attempts could cause
catastrophic accidents with the potential for injuries to those in and around the vehicle when the
control of the vehicle is taken from the driver or automated driving system. To prevent these
attempts or to remedy the potential consequences of the attacks, it is important to understand
how drivers will respond to such attempts when using manual or automated driving.
Automated driving is different from manual driving in that the level of automation could
affect the driver’s perception of relevant information from their dynamic environment, referred
to as situation awareness (SA), and subsequently, the driver’s ability to respond to critical events
such as cyberattacks. There has been little empirical research examining automated driving
systems and manual driving in terms of which level of automation promotes safer responses to
malicious hacking attempts. Amoozadeh et al. (2015) examined ways the vehicle could defend
itself, such as lowering levels of automated control or potentially to manual control when an
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attack occurred. Although it is critical to design technology and automated systems to resist
these attacks from a cyber-security perspective, it is also important to investigate how human
drivers respond to hacking attempts at different levels of automation. In addition to level of
automation, providing an auditory warning is one potential way to help drivers respond to critical
events such as cyberattacks. Both sematic and non-semantic warnings have been used in
different situations, with semantic warnings often containing additional information compared to
non-semantic warnings (Chang, Lin, Fung, Hwang, & Doong, 2008; Hellier, Edworthy, Weedon,
Walters, & Adams, 2002; McKeown & Isherwood, 2007). In the context of warnings about
vehicle hacking attempts, the additional information provided by semantic warnings may
improve responses to the hacking attempts that are relatively rare. The current study aimed to
empirically explore the effect of level of automation and warning type on the operator’s
responses to vehicle hacking attempts in a driving simulator. The outcome of this experiment
was expected to inform the design of future vehicle systems that ensure efficient prevention of
automated vehicle (AV) hacking attempts.
Levels of Automation
The degree to which a human-machine system is referred to as automated depends on
how much control of the system is allocated to the automation or to the human. In the current
context, level of automation refers to the use of different automated and manual systems for
operating the vehicle and the amount of vehicle control allocated to the human. There is a
theoretical spectrum of system control that, when simplified, vary from complete human control
to complete automation control (Flemisch, Kelsch, Loper, Shieben, & Schindler, 2008). The
spectrum of system control varies widely between manual and fully automated control with
many of the current driver assistance technologies falling somewhere near the middle of the
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spectrum. According to SAE (2018), autonomous vehicles can be categorized into six levels
based on degree of automation. Level 0 has no driving automation and complete human control.
As the level rises, more automation is implemented until Level 5, full system automation with no
driver control required, is reached. For example, the introduction of automation to create more
advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) has created products that allow for automated
control of different aspects of the vehicle system relevant to vehicle driving and control.
Vehicles with one or more of these systems could serve as an example of a semi-autonomous
system, for which control over the human-machine system is shared between the human and the
automation.
Level 3 conditional automated vehicles are capable of controlling the lateral (lane
keeping) and longitudinal (speed and braking) aspects of driving and only require the driver to be
prepared as fallback after the vehicle issues a warning or request (Petermeijer, Doubek, & de
Winter, 2017; SAE, 2018). Vehicles that are capable of level 3 conditional automated driving are
designed to operate within the functional limits of the vehicle system (Petermeijer et al., 2017).
When the automation is no longer capable of controlling one or more aspects of vehicle control
or it leaves its operational domain, the driver is warned, and a takeover request is issued (Gold et
al., 2013; Petermeijer et al., 2017). The human’s response to takeover requests could change
based upon the level of automation the vehicle is operating at (Carsten, Lai, Barnard, Jamson,
and Merat, 2012; de Winter, Happee, Martens, & Stanton, 2014). The current experiment
compared human responses to a critical event when using between Level 2 and 3 automation and
Level 0 manual driving.
For vehicles with conditional automated assistance technologies, monitoring the system’s
performance is an additional task allocated to the driver (Petermeijer et al., 2017). The use of
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automated systems as support for the driving task may decrease the attentional resources
required for the driving task and as such the human may decide to allocate their attentional
resources to secondary tasks. The human operator’s attentional resource allocation affects the
operator’s ability to monitor and cooperate with the automated system (Yamani & Horrey,
2018). For instance, Carsten, Lai, Barnard, Jamson, and Merat (2012) found that as higher levels
of automation were used, participants became more likely to engage in a secondary task such as
watching a DVD player. Engagement in a secondary task could lower the driver’s ability to
acquire appropriate SA for the driving task and inhibit their ability to correctly respond to critical
events (Merat et al., 2012). Alternatively, if the system is not performing to the human’s
satisfaction, they may decide to allocate more attentional resources to monitoring the system or
taking responsibilities back from the automation.
In summary, as shown by the currently expanding market of ADAS, surface
transportation is moving toward fully automated driving. Despite this trend, it is critical to
understand whether higher automation levels are more beneficial in terms of safety and SA
compared to manual driving. This study compared drivers’ responses in a manual driving mode
and an automated driving mode when faced with a novel complex critical event (i.e., a potential
cyber-attack).
Level of Automation and Situation Awareness
The level of automation used has the potential to affect the driver’s ability to monitor for
and appropriately respond to critical events as a result of differing levels of situation awareness
(SA). Situation awareness refers to “a person’s perception of relevant information from their
dynamic environment within a given time and space, the comprehension of its meaning, and
projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley & Garland, 2000, p. 3). Despite the
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intention of automation, many automated systems still require the human as a critical part of the
system (SAE, 2018). In many automated systems, the human is required to monitor the system
for failures and monitor the environment for scenarios that are outside of the automated systems
capabilities (Endsley, 1996). However, the introduction of automation can negatively impact the
operator’s cognitive processes leading to inaccurate or slow responses to novel critical events
(Endsley & Garland, 2000). Higher levels of automation have been found to lower the operator’s
SA, and consequently, result in detriments to the operator’s potential response to novel critical
events (Endsley & Garland, 2000). Despite this, in the context of surface transportation, higher
levels of vehicle automation are often considered desirable. Highly automated driving systems
may eventually lead to increased driving safety and reliability by reducing the demands on the
driver. Relieving the user of the driving task, in turn, could lead to higher levels of comfort for
the driver (Endsley & Garland, 2000; Gold et al., 2013).
A central issue stemming from the use of automation in human-machine systems is the
human-out-of-the-loop performance problem (Endsley, 1996; Kessel & Wickens, 1982). When
humans are monitoring automation, they are often found to be slower at detecting issues that
require them to intervene in the system potentially due to lower SA levels (Kaber & Endsley,
2004). Additionally, once the issue is detected, extra time is needed for the humans to become
situationally aware enough to determine the state of the human-machine system and decide the
appropriate response (Endsley, 1996). The level of control that the human has over the humanmachine system could dictate the way the human responds to incidents that occur during the use
of the system (de Winter, Happee, Martens, & Stanton, 2014). For instance, if the human is not
at all engaged in controlling the system, then they may be less engaged in and attentive to what
the system is doing as a result of their attention being allocated elsewhere.
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The increased use of assistance technologies with automation in driving, and the
subsequent rise in level of automation in vehicles, could lead to the operator allocating their
attention to other non-driving related tasks (Carsten et al., 2012). According to Endsley (1995), if
fewer attentional resources are allocated to the driving task then the driver may not achieve
higher levels of SA. The driver’s SA levels can be negatively impacted by automation which
may lead to poor responses to novel critical events (Endsley & Garland, 2000). Until automation
is completely self-sufficient, there will be instances where human input is required because the
automation assistant is incapable of handling some aspect of the situation it is faced with. When
a system inadequacy happens, input from the driver is often required and a takeover request is
given to the driver. The amount of time that it takes for the driver to successfully resume control
of the vehicle is thought to depend upon their SA and identifying information about their
environment (Endsley, 1996). After the driver has gathered sufficient information about the
current situation then they can decide how to resume control of the vehicle. This process is
referred to as a takeover, and despite the positive aspects of automation in surface transportation,
takeover and take-over requests take time for the driver to understand and respond to (Gold,
Dambock, Lorenz, & Bengler, 2013).
The system’s level of automation could affect the operator’s SA level and subsequently
affect the operator’s performance. For example, Kaber and Endsley (2004) examined how levels
of automation and adaptive automation characteristics affected the participant’s SA,
performance, and workload in a non-driving related context. The researchers had the participants
do a simulation and gauge monitoring task. The experiment found that the primary task
performance (i.e. the gauge monitoring task performance) was more closely associated with SA
than with mental workload. The authors found that level of automation was the strongest
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predictor of primary task performance and the operator’s SA level (Kaber & Endsley, 2004).
Furthermore, this change in SA due to change in level of automation is thought to result from
three major mechanisms (Endsley & Kiris, 1995). The first mechanism is the change in vigilance
and complacency that occurs when humans monitor automation. The second mechanism is the
human’s assumed role change from active to passive in regard to vehicle control. The last
mechanism is the change in quality or form of the feedback provided to the operator. To examine
the effect of automation implementation on human performance, Wickens and Kessel (1979,
1981) performed experiments that demonstrated longer recovery times and poorer response
accuracy for operators who had automation controlling the primary task before the critical event
occurred. These studies showed the deficit in SA and subsequent responses caused by the
implementation of automation in the primary task. For tasks such as driving, the negative effects
automation has on human responses to critical events could lead to increased accidents and less
safe roads.
The relationship between SA and level of automation is important to understanding
responses to critical events occurring at different levels of automations in surface transportation.
Parasuraman and Manzey’s (2010) model of SA posits that SA is often lost as a result of
complacency potential and attention bias during the processing of information about their
situation. Both complacency potential and attentional bias are influenced by the level of
automation that is in use (Strand et al., 2014). Strand and colleagues (2014) found that
participants in the semi-automated vehicle were less likely to fail to take over control of the
vehicle in time to prevent an accident when compared to the highly automated condition. This
finding suggests that higher levels of automation can lead to degraded performance in the driving
task potentially due to lower SA at higher levels of automation. Humans are poor monitors of
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automation and this could lead to a variety of safety and efficiency problem in the surface
transportation domain as the field moves toward higher levels of automation (Strand et al.,
2014). The driver’s ability to respond to a critical event such as an automation failure is
dependent on their level of SA at the time of the event and is important to ensure the safety of
those in or around the vehicle. A driver’s failure to notice and respond to the automation failure
as a result of being “out-of-the-loop” at higher levels of automation, could lead to accidents and
lower vehicle safety.
To gather a deeper understanding of how level of automation empirically affects human
responses as a result of lowered SA, comparisons at different levels of automation need to be
performed. Whereas Strand and colleagues (2014) compared semi-automated and highly
automated driving, other research compared manual driving to driving with automation
controlling the vehicle. As an example, Shen and Neyens (2017) compared conditional
automated driving, with lane keeping and adaptive cruise control (conditional automated
driving), to manual driving. The authors found that participants in the manual driving group
responded to the system failure (critical event) significantly faster than participants in the
automated conditions when looking at reaction time to the critical event as the dependent
variable. Shen and Neyens suggest that this difference is a result of lower SA as the driver is
further out-of-the-loop in the automated driving group. These findings further suggest there is
potential for higher levels of automation to prevent the human from quickly and correctly
responding to system failures. The relationship between levels of automation and successful
response to critical events is still unclear, but a stronger understanding could lead to safer
transition of vehicle control in the future.
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The negative effect of higher automation on SA is an area of continued interest because
of the continued push towards full automation in the driving domain. In an attempt to understand
the relationship, Gold and colleagues (2013) compared automated driving to manual driving and
reported higher levels of SA for the manual driving group. The authors posit this increase in SA,
due to manual driving, led to approximately half as long reaction times to the critical event than
those in the automated condition. The researchers also found that when the driver had less time
to respond to the event, as a result of lower SA, they were more likely to use the brake than to
steer with the wheel in response to the event. The authors posit that the use of the brake in low
SA scenarios was to give the participant more time to analyze their dynamic environment and
come to an appropriate decision. Gold et al.’s study suggests that differences in reaction time and
response method are the result of differing levels of SA due to the level of automation present
(Gold et al., 2013). Further research into the effect of levels of automation on SA and
subsequently on driving performance is needed. The current study attempted to further
understand how higher levels of automation affect SA and responses to novel critical events.
While some studies have found that higher levels of automation lead to lower levels of
SA, other studies have found unclear results. For instance, Merat, Jamson, Lai, and Carsten
(2012) examined whether the level of vehicle automation and the presence of a secondary task
affected the participants driving performance level. The authors compared two levels of
automation (manual and automated) and examined how the driver responded to either a critical
incident (e.g., system failure) or no critical incident. The results indicated that the average
driving speed was lower for automated driving portions of the experiment when compared to the
manual driving portion. When a critical incident was present, average speeds were slower, and
were not affected by the presence of a secondary task. Merat et al. found that drivers responded
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to the “critical incident” the same regardless of driving method (manual vs. automated) when no
secondary task was present. However, the worst driver performance was obtained when the
participant was distracted by the secondary task in the automated driving mode. It follows that
this is the result of their attention being allocated elsewhere when the automation system needed
them to resume control. The results of Merat et al.’s research help to provide information about
how the vehicle level of automation affects driver SA, performance, and response to critical
events. Specifically, the results suggest that higher levels of vehicle automation may have
negative implications for driving safety.
Research in the driving domain that examined level of automation, SA, and driver’s
responses to critical events suggests that higher automation levels may lead to lower SA and
slower responses to critical events. Many of the experiments were conducted with repeated
critical events such as a car stopping in front of the participants. Endsley and Garland (2000)
suggested that automation could lead to slower responses to novel critical events. With
possibility of vehicle hacking due to increased level of automation, hacking attempts can be the
novel critical events that may solicit responses of human drivers that are distinct from the
repeated critical events studied before. The current experiment explored the effect the
relationship between automation level and SA has on human responses to novel hacking
attempts.
Level of Automation and Cyberattacks
Autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles, though helpful and potentially safer than
human operated vehicles, have risks and concerns that need to be addressed. Research into the
public concerns about driving with autonomous systems (Bazilinskyy, Kyriakidis, & de Winter,
2015; Kyriakidis, Happee, & de Winter, 2015; Schoettle & Sivak, 2014) has provided
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researchers with issues that need to be understood and accounted for as surface transportation
continues to head towards higher levels of automation. One potential concern for the future of
autonomous driving is the potential for vehicles with autonomous systems to be the subject of
cyberattacks (Amoozadeh et al., 2015). A cyberattack implies deliberate actions “to alter,
disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or networks or the information
and (or) programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks” (National Research
Council, 2009, p. 19).
As vehicles and related technologies continue to advance toward higher levels of
automation, they will become increasingly at risk for vehicle hacking (Amoozadeh et al., 2015).
Many of the systems that help a vehicle at higher levels of automation rely heavily on onboard
sensors and internet connectivity in order to make real time vehicle maneuvering decisions. The
connectivity and reliance on technology makes automated vehicles more vulnerable to
cyberattacks. Amoozadeh et al.’s simulation showed that insider cyberattacks caused significant
instability in the vehicle’s automated systems. Specifically, Amoozadeh et al. examined ways the
vehicle could defend itself. One tactic highlighted was downgrading to lower levels of automated
control or to manual control when a cyberattack occurred. This tactic of downgrading to lower
automation levels is limited by the level of automation the vehicle is at when the attack occurs. It
is critical to design technology and automated systems to resist cyberattacks, but it is also
important to investigate how human drivers respond to hacking attempts at different levels of
automation. Further understanding of how levels of automation affect human’s responses will
allow researchers to look at whether humans are capable of making the necessary decisions to
prevent a cyberattack from negatively affecting the vehicle.
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There have been multiple indicators of the increasing potential for vehicle hacking
attempts and their potential negative effects on driver safety. A public service announcement by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 2016 presented a step by step “How To” on what to
do if you suspect your vehicle is the victim of a cyberattack, further suggesting the greater
prevalence this issue may take in the near future (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016).
Additionally, multiple surveys have found that respondents are concerned about the hacking of
autonomous vehicles (Bansal, Kockelman, & Singh, 2016; Casley, Jardim, & Quartulli, 2013;
Menon, 2015; and Schoettle et al., 2014).
In our prior study, 537 people recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were
surveyed on their concerns with automated vehicle use and we found that less than 8% of the
responses contained a hacking concern (McManus, Chen, & Mishler, 2018). The difference in
responses shown in McManus et al. (2018) could be the result of the way the question was asked.
The prior studies (Bazilinskyy et al., 2015; Kyriakidis et al., 2015) prompted the respondents
about the possibility of autonomous vehicle hacking, whereas our pilot study used a freeresponse question that did not explicitly mention hacking. This difference as a result of how the
question is asked, suggests that when the user is prompted about vehicle hacking, they view it as
a serious problem, but much of the general public is unaware of the potential for vehicle
cyberattacks without being informed of it. Research that examines the effect of automation level
on novel vehicle hacking responses may provide detailed information about the effect
automation level has on driving related cognitive processes.
While not directly related to vehicle hacking, cyber security research suggests that
detecting a cyberattack is influenced by the amount of knowledge an individual has about cyber
security threat detection. Ben-Asher and Gonzalez (2015) found that individuals with more
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knowledge about cyber security threat detection were better at detecting malicious attacks.
Unfortunately, few people are aware of the potential for automated vehicle hacking without first
being informed of the risk (McManus et al., 2018). If the findings on cyber security are shown to
be similar in relation to vehicle hacking, then it could make a compelling case for educating the
public about the potential for vehicle hacking and its effect on the driver’s SA and responses.
The information gained from research on the effect of levels of automation on SA during novel
event responses could lead to the safer future implementation of automation in the surface
transportation domain. The current experiment further explored the human aspect of vehicle
hacking and will help to provide more insight into the understudied area of human responses to
vehicle hacking at different levels of automation.
Although little empirical research pertaining to driver/passenger hacking responses has
been performed in the surface transportation domain, some research has been conducted in the
field of aviation. The field of aviation was influential in the creation of human factors, and
human factors principles and research are often used to make aviation safer. Many of the
findings in the aviation domain are applicable to surface transportation. Defining the exact
parameters of a given hacking attempt is impossible due to the infinite ways and situations the
hack or cyberattack could occur. For this reason, and the recent introduction of vehicle hacking
as an issue, few researchers have attempted to examine the effect of novel vehicle hacks on
human response. Those that have looked at the effect of hacking attempts on human responses
have implemented a specifically designed control hack to examine its effect on operator
response. (For the sake of simplicity across related fields, vehicle hacking and cyberattacks will
be used interchangeably.) For example, Gontar and colleagues (2018) investigated the effect of
cyberattacks on pilot performance. Half of the pilots in the experiment were exposed to a
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cyberattack while the other half were not. Their results suggested that the cyberattack on the
pilot’s navigational aid negatively affected the pilots’ mental workload, eye movements, and
behavior. This was shown in self-report data from questionnaire responses and in the
deterioration of the pilot’s instrument monitoring and overall performance.
In an attempt to further examine the effect of cyberattacks on pilots, Gontar et al. (2018)
manipulated whether the pilot was warned about the incoming cyberattack in the experiment
with half of the participants receiving an ambiguous semantic warning from the air traffic control
tower and the remaining half not receiving the warning. The ambiguity of the warning was used
to determine if there was a difference in responses to the warning when it was followed by a
cyberattack or not. Warning the pilots about the possible cyberattack reduced the behavior and
performance deficits caused by the cyberattack and subsequently raised workload when the
attack occurred. Providing a warning when no attack was implemented resulted in higher
workload and behavior deficits similar to when the attack was actually implemented. This
suggests that warnings that precede an attack are helpful for mitigating the negative effects of the
attack, but false alarm warnings have negative effects on pilot performance.
The current study, similar to the Gontar et al. study, focused on how humans responded
to cyberattacks as well as whether warnings mitigated some of the negative effects of
cyberattacks. The current study expected to find similar benefits of warning implementation due
to an increase in SA on novel critical event response due to hacking attempts in the surface
transportation domain.
In summary, the overall amount of responses that express concern about vehicle hacking
found in McManus et al., (2018) suggests that the public believes vehicle hacking is a real issue
and is concerned about its potential. Hacking related research in aviation that shows the negative
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effect of hacking attempts on human operators, is at least of equal concern in the increasingly
automated surface transportation domain. With this in mind, researchers need to empirically
examine the way people respond in the event of a vehicle hacking attempt and how responses are
affected by the vehicle automation level.
Semantic Versus Non-Semantic Warnings in Surface Transportation
The predicted increase in vehicle hacking attempts is one of many issues that warnings
could be used to remedy. It is essential that warnings used in vehicles reflect the urgency of the
situation at hand and are representative of what they warn the user of (Politis, Brewster, &
Pollick, 2015). Auditory warnings are beneficial in the surface transportation context because
they are capable of attracting the driver’s attention during visually demanding tasks like driving
(Baldwin, 2011; Petermeijer et al., 2017). Moreover, speech-based warnings are capable of
expressing additional information due to the inclusion of their meaning in the warning itself, and
some messages convey more urgency than others based on the content of the warning (Hellier et
al., 2002).
Warnings with speech include semantic information that has the added benefit of
informing the driver about the hazard in addition to alerting them of the presence of the hazard.
The additional information provided by warnings including speech is of extra benefit to the
driver when the driver must perform a crash avoidance maneuver (Chang et al., 2008). The extra
information included in semantic warnings could potentially boost the user’s SA at the time of
the warning when compared to warnings that do not contain clear semantic information. The use
of auditory warnings to warn the driver of incoming vehicle hacking attempts could help to
improve human responses to vehicle hacking attempts. In order to use them in future vehicles, a
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further understanding of how the semantic information in warnings affects the driver’s SA is
needed.
Acoustic and semantic aspects of auditory warnings have been shown to affect each other
when used for collision avoidance (Baldwin & Moore, 2002; Baldwin & May, 2005). When
comparing speech words such as “danger, caution, and warning”, Bansal and May (2005) found
that the word “danger” received a higher hazard rating than “caution” and “warning”. The higher
hazard rating for danger has been replicated by other research (Politis et al., 2015). According to
Horswill and McKenna (2004), hazard perception can be considered SA for dangerous situations
in the driving environment. A novel vehicle hacking attempt while driving or monitoring
automated driving could serve as a dangerous situation in the driving environment. Politis et al.
(2015) found that non-semantic (tone-based) auditory cues had faster recognition times in low
criticality situations but that tone-based and speech-based cues have similar response times in
response to critical events. In the same study, the authors suggested the use of speech-based
warning due to a marginal increase in driving performance when speech-based warnings were
implemented. These findings suggest that the semantic content of a warning may affect the
driver’s ability to respond and the effect of the semantic information may depend on the
criticality of the situation.
The semantic information contained in a warning has been shown to dictate aspects of
human response and lead to different levels of reported urgency and pleasantness. For example,
McKeown and Isherwood (2007) found that non-semantic, tone-based sounds had the longest
response times and lowest accuracy whereas speech and auditory icons had the lowest response
times and highest accuracy. Additionally, in the same study, the participants reported speech
warnings to be more pleasant and less urgent than non-semantic sounds. When comparing speech
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based and non-speech based auditory warnings, Edworthy and colleagues (2000) found no
difference in perceived urgency of the warnings. Politis et al. (2015) claim that other than the
Edworthy et al.’s study no other study had compared these two warning types with regards to
urgency. Politis and colleagues compared language-based warnings with between three and six
words to tone-based warnings at three different levels of urgency. They found no significant
differences between the two warning types in number of mistakes made in response to the
warnings, recognition time, or response time. Politis et al. posit that the lack of a difference in
responses suggests language-based warnings perform just as well as tone-based warnings, which
leads to a potential advantage for language-based warnings due to their higher pleasantry ratings
and additional semantic content.
Past research has examined critical events that are often repeated and common such as
braking in response to a vehicle. The similarity between semantic and non-semantic warnings
may not be found when a novel critical event occurs because of the increased need for additional
SA for unfamiliar situations. The addition of extra information in a semantic warning may
increase SA for the driver enough to affect the quality of their response to a hacking attempt. The
current study aimed to expand on the Politis et al.’s (2015) findings by comparing warnings with
semantic information (e.g. Semantic, Verbal warnings) to warnings without semantic
information (e.g. Non-Semantic, Tone-Based warnings) to examine if semantic information
affected driver SA and responses to novel vehicle hacking attempts. The current study hoped to
make this comparison and provide further information about the effect of semantic information
in warnings on driver SA.
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Current Study
Little empirical research on automated vehicle hacking has been done and research on
how individuals respond to automation hacking in general is very limited (McManus et al.,
2018). To bridge this gap in the literature, research on driver reactions to vehicle hacking at
different levels of automation is essential. The current study compared human reactions to a
vehicle hacking incident when the vehicle was operating at between Level 2 and Level 3 (SAE,
2018) automation (Automated Condition) to traditional manual driving (Manual Condition)
using a driving simulator. To develop strategies to prevent the negative effects of automated
vehicle hacking, there is a need to investigate how humans interact with the vehicle in the event
of a hacking attempt. The present research examined how humans responded to a simulated
aggressive vehicle hacking attempt.
A between-subject design was used to examine the effect of level of automation
(Automated vs. Manual) and auditory warning type (Semantic vs. Non-Semantic) on how the
drivers responded to the vehicle hacking attempt. The hacking attempt, in this experiment, was a
loss of vehicle control as it drives off the road towards vehicles and buildings. This loss of
control due to the simulated hacking attack was preceded by an auditory warning dependent
upon which warning condition the participant was assigned to.
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the manual driving group were expected to have higher
TTC values than the participants in the automated driving group. The rationale for this
hypothesis was that participants in the manual condition were expected to have higher SA for the
primary task (in this case, vehicle control) than those in the automated condition, leading to
faster reaction times and subsequently higher TTC values, as found in past studies (Gold et al.,
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2013; Kaber & Endsley, 2007; Kessel & Wickens, 1979, 1981: Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010;
Shen et al., 2017; Strand et al., 2014).
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the manual driving group were expected to have more
successful responses than the participants in the automated driving group. This expectation was
consistent with Hypothesis 1, wherein participants in the manual group were expected to have
faster reaction times than those in the automated groups as a result of higher SA levels. Faster
reaction times were expected to translate to more successful responses in the manual condition in
our experiment (Gold et al., 2013; Shen et al., 2017; Strand et al., 2014).
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the manual driving group were expected to have different
reaction methods (wheel turns, pedal presses, etc.) than the participants in the automated driving
group. The elevated SA of manual drivers was expected to result in different responses to the
critical event as found in past studies (Gold et al., 2013; Kaber & Endsley, 2007; Merat et al.,
2012). It was expected that more pedal responses may be found in the automated condition as
they brake to give themselves more time to gather information about the situation and decide
upon the correct method of response.
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the semantic warning condition were expected to have
larger TTC values than participants in the non-semantic warning condition. The semantic
warning was expected to provide more information than the non-semantic tone-based warning
and increase the driver’s SA more than the non-semantic tone-based warning (Chang et al., 2008;
Hellier et al., 2002; McKeown & Isherwood, 2007), resulting in higher TTC values for the
semantic warning condition.
Hypothesis 5: There was expected to be an interaction between level of automation and
warning type such that, in the manual driving group, the addition of the semantic warning would
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have less of a positive effect on TTC values than in the automated driving group. The addition of
semantic information from the semantic warning is unlikely to be as helpful to the operator when
they are already at a higher level of SA in the manual condition. Adding semantic information to
the warning is likely to be more helpful to participants in the automated driving group because it
will boost their SA more than in the manual driving group (Chang et al., 2008; Hellier et al.,
2002; McKeown & Isherwood, 2007), leading to an interaction between level of automation and
warning type.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants and Recruitment
All participants for this study were recruited using the Old Dominion University SONA
participant recruitment system (https://odupsychology.sona-systems.com). All participants were
granted SONA credits towards their course requirements in various psychology courses. A pilot
study that contained 28 participants was performed to ensure that the experiment and data
collection process were in order. Next, a total of 72 undergraduates between the ages of 18
(required age for participation in the SONA participant recruitment system) and 25 participated
in the experiment (for power analysis information please see Appendix A). The cutoff age of 25
was chosen based on the findings of Wetton et al.’s (2010) study. Wetton and colleagues found
significant differences in hazard perception ability between 18-25 and 26-45-year-old drivers. In
order to avoid contaminating our sample with groups of different hazard perception abilities it
was decided to focus on a convenience sample of college age students (18-25). The participants
were tested in individual sessions on a driving simulator. Each session lasted approximately 50
minutes. The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Old Dominion
University.
The final sample contained 72 participants that were randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental conditions (18 per groups). All participants reported normal or corrected to normal
vision and hearing according to the demographics survey given to all participants. The final
sample population was majority female (N = 56; 77.8%). All participants were between the ages
of 18-23 years old with an average age of 19.44 (SD = 1.55) years. The sample ethnicity was
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47.2% African/African American, 36.1% Caucasian, 8.3% More than one race, 5.6% Asian, and
2.8% Other/Unknown.
Of the 72 participants collected 65 (90.3%) reported a private vehicle as their primary
mode of transportation, with the remaining seven (9.7%) reporting walking and cycling as their
primary mode of transportation. The participants reported the average age when they received
their first license as 16.63 years old (SD = 0.86). When asked whether they drove to school or
not, 63 participants (87.5%) reported that they did drive to school whereas nine participants
(12.5%) reported that they did not drive to school. When asked about their driving frequency
over the last twelve months, 45 (62.5%) of the seventy-two participants reported driving every
day, 19 (26.4%) reported driving often, six (8.3%) reported driving sometimes, and two (2.8%)
reported driving rarely. The average amount of accidents in the last three years for the entire
sample was 0.63 accidents (SD = .85). Overall, the sample contained participants who were
familiar with driving and avoided accidents. The collected sample should serve as good basis for
understanding how young drivers (18-25 years old) respond to a vehicle hacking attempt under
different automation and warning conditions (Wetton et al., 2010).
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli were presented to the participants using a dual monitor personal computer
running the STISIM Drive 3 software (http://stisimdrive.com). The stimuli were presented to the
participants using a 27-inch Dell P2717H LCD Monitor with 1920x1080 pixel resolution and an
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 graphic card. There were two monitors present. The additional
monitor was used by the experimenter to control the programs and was not shown to the
participants. Participant inputs were performed using a Logitech G29 driving wheel and pedals
(See Appendix B).
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Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor with a steering wheel and foot
pedals for driving based responses to the program. They were first asked to sign the informed
consent and fill out a basic demographics survey (see Appendix C). The participants were then
seated so that they had access to the driving wheel and pedals. Participants performed a fiveminute driving simulator practice session that consisted of freely navigating through a city with
no ambient traffic. This was done to allow the participants to familiarize themselves with the
driving simulator and to make sure that simulator sickness was not an issue.
The participants were then assigned to one of four groups. The level of automation
(automated vs. manual) and warning type (semantic vs non-semantic) were randomly assigned to
each participant, and they served as the experiment’s main independent variables. The groups
included the following combinations of the IVs: Manual Driving and Semantic Warning, Manual
Driving and Non-Semantic Warning, Automated Driving and Semantic Warning, and Automated
Driving and Non-Semantic Warning. Participants were assigned to one of the four groups.
The automated groups contained participants that were in the automated driving group
(between SAE Levels 2 and 3). Participants in the automated groups were asked to actively
watch as the automated vehicle system drove them to class and instructed to keep their hands on
the simulator steering wheel and feet ready at the pedals. The drive to class lasted approximately
20 minutes. This time was chosen based on the average commute time of 20 minutes for
residence of Hampton Roads wherein our subjects reside (Old Dominion University Social
Sciences Research Center, 2015). The manual groups contained participants in the manual
driving group. Participants in the manual groups were asked to manually drive themselves in the
same simulator set up and along the same route as the automated groups, to class/work. Both
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groups were asked to monitor their vehicle to ensure that their vehicle followed the rules of the
road including all speed limits and were monitored by the researchers to ensure compliance.
The semantic warning group received a semantic auditory warning that stated “Danger,
hacking attempt incoming”. This warning lasted for two seconds and immediately preceded the
hacking attempt. The non-semantic warning group received a 500 Hz tone that lasted for two
seconds and immediately preceded the hacking attempt. Participants were instructed to respond
to their respective warnings by safely taking control of the vehicle.
In addition, participants in the manual condition were instructed to follow all posted
speed limits and the rules of the road. Each participant was asked to participate in two drives.
During the first drive no hacking incident occurred, and this served as a route and system
familiarization drive. The second drive contained the vehicle hacking event approximately three
quarters of the way through the route.
For the second drive, the route began the same as in the first drive, but approximately
three quarters of the way through the route a vehicle hacking attempt took place. The hacking
attempt was preceded by the vehicle security system’s warning that was dependent upon which
warning group the participant was assigned to. Upon the completion of the warning, the vehicle
abruptly angled off the road toward a parked car and buildings on either the left or right side of
the road. The hacking attempt lasted for five seconds, then the vehicle made contact with a
parked car if no response was made. The five-second hacking duration was decided upon based
on a meta-analysis done by Eriksson and Stanton (2017) wherein the results suggested that when
no secondary task was present, it took participants approximately five seconds to take control of
the vehicle from the automation. Upon contact with the parked car, the simulator simulated a
crash and the simulation ended. When this occurred, it was recorded as a failed response. If the
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driver reacted in time and responded, the type of response, and the TTC values were recorded.
When participants responded in time to avoid a collision and resumed normal driving, it was
recorded as a successful response. After completion of the driving portion of the experiment, the
participants were asked additional questions about their driving experience (see Appendix D) and
given a Participant Experiment Opinion Survey that contained questions about their
understanding and interpretation of the experiment (see Appendix E). Next, credit was granted
by the researcher and the participant was asked not to tell others about the experiment and
allowed to leave.
Dependent Measures
The participant’s reactions to the hacking attempt provided information on how humans
respond in the event of an aggressive vehicle hacking attempt. The current study specifically
examined the methods with which the participants responded. The dependent variables that were
collected are: Method of response (wheel turn vs pedal press), successful response, and TTC
(Time to Collision).The participant’s responses to the hacking attempt and accompanied warning
were scored as 1= a wheel turn only, 2= pedal press only, or 3= both wheel turn and pedal press.
The type of response was scored by the researcher based on the first frame of response data for
each participant where they responded with a wheel turn greater than two degrees or a change in
pedal depression that causes a change in acceleration/deceleration of more than 1 m/s2 (Hergath
et al.,2017; Merat et al., 2012; Petermeijer et al., 2017; Radlmayr et al.,2014) . . Method of
response served as the first dependent variable that was examined. A succeed/fail criterion which
was used to determine whether the takeover response was successful or not and was based upon
whether the participant responded in time to avoid a collision and resume normal driving.
Participants who responded to the hack and accompanied warning in time to avoid an accident
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and resumed normal driving were scored as successful responses. Successful responses were
denoted by a 0, and those who did not avoid an accident were scored as unsuccessful responses,
denoted by a 1. This successful response variable was compared between the two different
driving groups in order to see which level of automation resulted in the highest successful
response rate and as a result avoided the accident most frequently. The number of successful
responses served as the second dependent variable that was examined.
The TTC information was measured as the time remaining until impact with the vehicle
or building and the TTC measurement was started after the vehicle hacking attempt warning tone
was completed. As such, it provides information about how quickly the driver was able to
respond to the cyberattack. Higher TTC’s are preferable in our study as high TTC’s indicate
more time remaining before the accident occurs. The entire time from the warning to collision
was approximately seven seconds. Time to collision data was compared between the four groups.
TTC served as the third dependent variable that was examined, but TTC was only collected for
the participants who responded before a collision occurred. This was done to ensure that zero
TTC scores of those who failed to respond did not skew the TTC values that were examined and
compared between groups. The information gleaned from these dependent measures may be
helpful in the future development of safety systems in the surface transportation domain.
Empirically comparing manual and automated driving and semantic and non-semantic warnings
will allow future researchers and designers to optimize the driver vehicle relationship.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Missing data/outliers. Prior to analyses, the collected data were cleaned (i.e., missing
data, outliers) and statistical assumptions for ANOVA were addressed. For the continuous
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variable TTC, there were two TTC data points collected that were more than three standard
deviations outside the mean TTC value. Winsorizing data takes significant outliers that otherwise
would not be able to be used as data points and converts them to the score of next lowest TTC
value that is not a significant outlier. This method allowed for the inclusion of data that
otherwise would have to be omitted and allowed the researcher to maintain an equal number of
participants in each experimental group. The two significant TTC outliers (2.619 seconds, 2.629
seconds) were Winsorized to the next lowest TTC score (4.579 seconds) from the dataset (Ghosh
& Vogt, 2012). The descriptive statistics, chi-squared distributions, assumption analyses, and
ANOVA’s were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics version 25.
The dependent variable (DV) TTC is continuous, and reaction type and successful
response rate are categorical. To test hypotheses pertaining to continuous dependent variables
(Hypotheses 1, 4, & 5) a 2x2 factorial ANOVA was conducted to determine mean differences on
each outcome measure (i.e., TTC values) between the different groups. To test hypotheses 2 and
3, the categorical hypotheses, chi-squared tests were performed to examine the differences in
successful responses and reaction methods between manual and automated driving groups.
ANOVA assumptions. The assumptions of ANOVA are the following: normality,
independence of observations, and homogeneity of variance. To test the assumption of
normality, histograms and Q-Q plots were used to examine skewness and kurtosis. When testing
the normality assumption for the TTC scores (Hypotheses 1, 4, and 5), the Winsorized TTC data
was used. When checking for normality of the Winsorized TTC data, the data were normally
distributed as shown by a skewness and kurtosis values of -.051 and -1.240 respectively which
fall between the cutoff values of -1.96 and 1.96 which represent the 95% confidence interval of a
standard normal z distribution (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2005). The assumption for independence of
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observations was addressed using participant randomization to study conditions (manual or
automated driving, non-semantic or semantic warning). Each group consisted of different
individuals who were not measured twice or specifically matched in any way. The assumption of
homogeneity of variance was checked to ensure the variance of data in each condition was the
same using a Levene’s test. The results of the Levene’s test on the Winsorized TTC was not
significant with F (3,68) = 0.11, p = .953, and as such the assumption of homogeneity of
variance was met.
ANOVA results. To test Hypotheses 1, 4, and 5, Winsorized TTC was examined across
level of automation condition (Manual or Automated) and across warning condition (NonSemantic or Semantic) using a 2x2 factorial ANOVA. It was found that there was no significant
effect of level of automation on TTC with F(3, 68) = 0.18, p = .673, ηp2 = .00. The mean TTC
value for the manual driving group (M = 4.63, SD = .03) was not significantly different from the
average TTC value for the automated driving group (M = 4.63, SD = .03). Based on the results of
the statistical analysis the researcher was unable to provide support for Hypothesis 1. It was also
found that there was no significant effect of warning condition on TTC with F(3, 68) = 1.20, p =
.278, ηp2 = .02. The average TTC value for the Non-Semantic warning condition (M = 4.63, SD =
.03) was not significantly different from the average TTC value for the Semantic warning (M =
4.62, SD = .03). Based on the results of the statistical analysis our data were unable to provide
support for Hypothesis 4. Lastly the interaction between and warning condition was not
significant with F(3, 68) = 0.57, p =.455, ηp2 = .01. Based on the result of the statistical analysis
the researcher was unable to provide support for the interaction predicted in Hypothesis 5.
Hypothesized chi-squared results. In order to test Hypothesis 2, the hypothesis that
pertained to successful responses a chi-squared analysis was performed. Three of the seventy-
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two participants successfully avoided crashing into a car or building and were able to regain
control of the vehicle to safely resume normal driving. Two of the successful responses occurred
for participants in the automated semantic condition and the other successful response occurred
in the automated non-semantic condition. These results suggest that the vehicle hacking attempt
used in the current study may have been too difficult for the participants to safely respond. The
results indicate that level of automation does not have a significant effect on successful
responses, χ2(1) =1.06, p = .303, not supporting Hypothesis 2.
In order to test Hypothesis 3, a chi-squared analysis was performed. Sixty-four of the
seventy-two participants responded with only a wheel turn as there first recorded response to the
hacking attempt and accompanied warning (scored as a 1). The remaining eight responses were
wheel turns and pedal presses (scored as a 3). The results of the chi-squared analysis showed that
there was no significant effect of level of automation on response type, χ2(1) = .00, p = 1.00. The
result of the chi-squared analysis fails to provide support for Hypothesis 3.
Qualitative survey response results. A post-experiment survey was given to all
participants in an attempt to gain insight into their understanding and opinions about automated
vehicles and the current experiment. For the first question of the post experiment survey, the
participants were given one of following statements, “I was engaged in driving the vehicle for the
entire ride” (Manual) or “I was engaged in monitoring the automated driving system for the
entire ride” (Automated), and asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement on a fivepoint Likert scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). A 2x2 ANOVA was used to
determine if there was a difference in reported engagement due to level of automation or warning
type. There was no significant difference in reported engagements due to level of automation,
F(3, 68) = 1.84, p =.180, ηp2 = .03. There was no significant difference in reported engagements
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due to warning condition, F(3, 68) = 0.14, p =.713, ηp2 = .00. There was no significant
interaction between level of automation and warning condition for reported engagement as
shown by F(3, 68) = 0.74, p =.391, ηp2 = .01.
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Figure 1. Reported engagement during drive (error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean).
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Participants were also asked whether they noticed a warning during the drive. Chisquared analyses were used to determine if there was a statistical difference in the number of
participants that reported noticing a warning due to level of automation and warning condition.
For level of automation there was not a significantly different number of participants that
reported noticing the warning, χ2(1) = 2.49, p = .114. However, for warning condition, there was
a statistically different number of participants that reported noticing the warning, χ2(1) = 9.97, p
= .002.
The counts in Table 1 show that participants that received a semantic warning reported
that they noticed a warning (Manual Semantic had only 3 no responses, Automated Semantic had
only 1 no response) more than participants who received a non-semantic warning (Manual NonSemantic had 10 no responses, Automated Non-Semantic had 6 no responses). This suggests that
non-semantic warnings were more frequently not noticed as a warning compared to semantic
warnings. Additionally, non-semantic warnings resulted in less reports of noticing the warnings
(Manual Non-Semantic had 8 yes responses, Automated Non-Semantic had 12 yes responses)
than participants who received semantic warnings (Manual Semantic had 15 yes responses,
Automated Semantic had 17 yes responses). This suggests that participants who received a
semantic warning more frequently reported noticing the warning as a warning than non-semantic
warning recipients based on the counts.
Participants in the manual driving group reported not noticing the warning (Manual NonSemantic had 10 participants, Manual Semantic had 3 participants) more frequently than the
participants in the automated driving group (Automated Non-Semantic had 6 participants,
Automated Semantic had 1 participant). Participants in the manual driving group reported
noticing the warning (Manual Non-Semantic had 8 participants, Manual Semantic had 15
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participants) less frequently than the participants in the automated driving group (Automated
Non-Semantic had 12 participants, Automated Semantic had 17 participants).
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Table 1
Count of Whether Participants Noticed Warning or Not
Noticed Warning?
Group

No

Yes

Manual Non-Semantic

10

8

Manual Semantic

3

15

Automated Non-Semantic

6

12

Automated Semantic

1

17

Total

20

52
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The participants in both level of automation conditions and warning conditions that
reported noticing the warning were then asked, “What did the warning you received represent?”
with four response options (A system malfunction, an automation failure, a vehicle hacking
attempt, or other). The participants’ responses to the question were broken down by level of
automation (Manual or Automated) and the warning type they received (Semantic or NonSemantic). A chi-squared analysis was used to determine if the perceived representation of the
warning was significantly different across the four experimental groups (Manual Non-semantic,
Manual Semantic, Automated Non-semantic, and Automated Semantic). The four groups did not
have significantly different perceived representations of the warning, χ2(3) = 6.09, p = .107 (See
Table 2).
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Table 2
Perceived Warning Meaning Counts
Perceived Warning Meaning
Vehicle
Hacking
Attempt

System
Malfunction

Other

Automation
Failure

Manual Non-Semantic

1

4

2

1

Manual Semantic

10

4

0

1

Automated Non-Semantic

0

2

1

9

Automated Semantic

8

6

1

2

Total

19

16

4

13

Group
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In addition, chi-squared analyses were used to determine if the perceived representation
of the warning was significantly different based upon level of automation and warning type when
the responses were scored as a vehicle hacking attempt or as not a vehicle hacking attempt. For
level of automation there were not significantly different perceived representations of the
warning, χ2(1) = 2.99, p = .224. However, for warning condition, there were significantly
different perceived representation of the warning, χ2(1) = 19.17, p < .001. For specific counts of
the perceived representations see Table 3 below. These findings suggest that level of automation
did not significantly affect the perceived representation of the warning as a hack or not, but the
warning type did.
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Table 3
Perceived Warning Meaning Counts: Hacking Attempt vs. Not a Hacking Attempt
Perceived Warning Meaning
Vehicle
Hacking
Attempt

Not a Vehicle
Hacking
Attempt

Manual Non-Semantic

1

7

Manual Semantic

10

5

Automated Non-Semantic

0

12

Automated Semantic

8

9

Total

19

33

Group
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Participants that reported noticing the warning were also given the statement, “I
perceived the warning I received to be urgent” and asked to rate their level of agreement with the
statement on a five-point Likert scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). A 2x2
ANOVA was used to determine if there was a difference in reported urgency due to level of
automation or warning condition. There was no significant difference in reported urgency due to
level of automation shown by F(3, 68) = 2.25, p =.140, ηp2 = .05. There was a significant effect
difference in reported urgency due to warning condition shown by F(3, 68) = 4.43, p =.041, ηp2 =
.08. There was also a significant interaction between level of automation and warning type for
reported urgency shown by F(3, 68) = 5.21, p =.027, ηp2 = .10. These findings suggest that nonsemantic warnings are perceived as less urgent than semantic warnings but only in the manual
driving condition.
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Figure 2. Reported perceived urgency of warning (error bars represent 1 standard error of the
mean).
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All participants in the study were asked “Were you aware of the potential for vehicle
hacking before this experiment?”. Chi-squared analyses were used to determine if the number of
participants with previous knowledge of vehicle hacking was significantly different due to level
of automation or warning condition. For level of automation there was a significantly different
number of participants with previous knowledge of vehicle hacking, χ2(1) = 12.77, p < .001.
However, for warning condition there was not a significantly different number of participants
with previous knowledge of vehicle hacking, χ2(1) = 0.36, p = .551. For specific counts of
participants with previous hacking knowledge see Table 4 below. These findings suggest that
there was a significant difference in the number of participants with previous knowledge of
vehicle hacking attempts when examined based upon level of automation but not when examined
based upon warning condition.

51
Table 4
Count of Participants Who Reported Previous Knowledge of Vehicle Hacking
Previous Knowledge of Vehicle
Hacking Potential?
Group

No

Yes

Manual Non-Semantic

17

1

Manual Semantic

18

0

Automated Non-Semantic

13

5

Automated Semantic

10

8

Total

58

14
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CHAPTER IV
EXPLORATORY RESULTS
The researcher performed several exploratory analyses that were not included in the
proposed analyses to gain further insight into the effects of level of automation and warning
condition on participants response quality. These measures of response quality included
maximum steering wheel angle, maximum steering wheel angle over time, and maximum
resulting acceleration. The measures of response quality used in the current study were included
in order to gain more specific additional information about the participants responses to the
vehicle hacking attempt. More detailed analysis of the quality of the responses may provide
additional information about the hacking attempt responses above that provided by the
hypothesized analysis.
Maximum steering wheel angle. The first exploratory analysis preformed pertained to
maximum steering wheel angle which is measured in degrees. Maximum steering wheel angle
was calculated by taking the difference of the angles of participant’s initial wheel turn response
greater than two degrees and the participant’s largest (most severe) wheel turn across the
duration of the hacking attempt (Shen & Neyens, 2017). Two degrees was used as the wheel
response cutoff due to its use in the literature as the smallest number of degrees the steering
wheel is required to move to count as a wheel response (Merat et al., 2012; Petermeijer et al.,
2017; Radlmayr et al., 2014). Maximum steering wheel angle is an indication of response quality
such that larger maximum steering wheel angle values are considered less safe.
Maximum steering wheel angle was analyzed using a 2x2 factorial ANOVA to determine
if level of automation (Manual or Automated) or warning type (Semantic or Non-Semantic) had
an effect on the participants maximum steering wheel angle. Before the ANOVA was conducted,
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the assumptions of normality, independence of observations, and homogeneity of variance were
addressed for maximum steering wheel angle and the data was checked for significant outliers.
There were no significant outliers and the skewness and kurtosis values of .94 and -.51
respectively suggest the data is sufficiently normal because they fall between the cutoff values of
-1.96 and 1.96 which represent the 95% confidence interval of a standard normal z distribution
(Gravetter & Wallnau, 2005). The assumption for independence of observations was addressed
using participant randomization to study conditions (manual or automated driving, non-semantic
or semantic warning). The assumption of homogeneity of variance was checked to ensure the
variance of data in each condition was the same using a Levene’s test. The results of the
Levene’s test on maximum steering wheel angle was significant with F(3, 68) = 3.77, p =.015,
and as such the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. ANOVA is sensitive to
violations of homogeneity of variance, but this sensitivity is mitigated due to the equal sample
sizes for each level of each independent variable (Sawyer, 2009).
There was a significant effect of level of automation on maximum steering wheel angle,
F(3, 68) = 4.53, p = .037, ηp2 = .06 (See Figure 3). The mean maximum steering wheel angle for
participants in the Manual driving group was M = 505.12 (SD = 75.64) and the mean maximum
steering wheel angle for participants in the Automated driving group was M = 548.45 (SD =
97.25). There was an effect of warning condition was not significant, F(3, 68) = 3.19, p = .079,
ηp2 = .05 (See Figure 3). The mean maximum steering wheel angle for participants in the
Semantic warning condition was M = 544.95 (SD = 91.41) and the mean maximum steering
wheel angle for participants in the Non-Semantic condition was M = 508.61 (SD = 84.34). There
was not a significant interaction between level of automation condition and warning condition
for maximum steering wheel angle, F(3, 68) = .026, p = .873, ηp2 = .00.
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Figure 3. Maximum steering wheel angle (error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean).
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Maximum steering wheel angle over time. In addition to maximum steering wheel
angle, maximum steering wheel angle over time was calculated and is a unique use of the
previously used maximum steering wheel angle dependent variable that was created to further
analyze the results of the experiment. Maximum steering wheel angle over time was calculated
by taking the calculated maximum steering wheel angle and dividing it by the time between the
initial and largest reaction. Maximum steering wheel angle over time allowed researchers to
quantify how quickly the participant turned the wheel from their initial response to their most
severe response. Maximum steering wheel angle over time is a measure of response quality such
that larger values are more dangerous responses based on how quickly the user turned the wheel
from their initial turn to their most severe turn.
Maximum steering wheel angle over time was analyzed using a 2x2 factorial ANOVA to
determine if level of automation (Manual or Automated) or warning type (Semantic or NonSemantic) had an effect on the participants maximum steering wheel angle over time. Before the
ANOVA was conducted the assumptions of normality, independence of observations, and
homogeneity of variance were addressed for maximum steering wheel angle over time and the
data was checked for significant outliers. There were no significant outliers and the skewness
and kurtosis values of 1.29 and -.08 respectively suggest the data is sufficiently normal because
they fall between the cutoff values of -1.96 and 1.96 which represent the 95% confidence
interval of a standard normal z distribution (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2005). The assumption for
independence of observations was addressed using participant randomization to study conditions
(manual or automated driving, non-semantic or semantic warning). The assumption of
homogeneity of variance was checked to ensure the variance of data in each condition was the
same using a Levene’s test. The results of the Levene’s test on maximum steering wheel angle
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over time was significant with F (3,68) = 2.97, p = .04, and as such the assumption of
homogeneity of variance was not met. The violation of ANOVA’s assumption of homogeneity of
variance is mitigated due to the equal sample sizes for each level of each independent variable
(Sawyer, 2009).
There was not a significant effect of level of automation on maximum steering wheel
angle over time with F (3,68) =.65, p = .424, ηp2 = .01. The mean maximum steering wheel angle
over time for participants in the Manual driving group was M = 202.19 (SD = 103.43) and the
mean maximum steering wheel angle over time for participants in the Automated driving group
was M = 221.66 (SD = 102.43). There was no significant effect of warning condition on
maximum steering wheel angle over time with F (3,68) = 1.41, p = .240, ηp2 = .02. The mean
maximum steering wheel angle over time for participants in the Semantic warning condition was
M = 197.59 (SD = 86.32) and the mean maximum steering wheel angle over time for participants
in the Non-Semantic condition was M = 226.27 (SD = 116.24). There was not a significant
interaction between level of automation condition and warning condition for maximum steering
wheel angle over time with F (3,68) = 1.04, p = .312, ηp2 = .02.
Maximum resulting acceleration. An additional measure of response quality was also
collected. Maximum resulting acceleration is calculated by taking the square root of the sum of
the squared values of the vehicles longitudinal and lateral accelerations and is presented in m/s2
(Gold et al., 2013; Hergeth, Lorenz, & Krems, 2017). If maximum resulting accelerations are
high and approach the physical limits of the vehicle and the vehicle’s tires, the vehicle may
become unstable. Thus, lower maximum resulting accelerations are safer and considered better
quality responses.

57
Before the maximum resulting acceleration data was analyzed across driving and warning
conditions the assumptions of ANOVA were checked. There were ten significant outliers in the
maximum resulting acceleration data. The skewness and kurtosis values of 1.46 and .39
respectively suggest the data is sufficiently normal because they fall between the cutoff values of
-1.96 and 1.96 which represent the 95% confidence interval of a standard normal z distribution
(Gravetter & Wallnau, 2005). The assumption for independence of observations was addressed
using participant randomization to study conditions (manual or automated driving, non-semantic
or semantic warning). The assumption of homogeneity of variance was checked to ensure the
variance of data in each condition was the same using a Levene’s test. The results of the
Levene’s test on maximum resulting acceleration was not significant with F (3,68) = 2.30, p =
.085 and as such the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.
A 2*2 factorial ANOVA was performed to determine if level of automation (Manual or
Automated) or warning type (Semantic or Non-Semantic) had an effect on the participants
maximum resulting acceleration values. There was not a significant effect of level of automation
on maximum resulting acceleration with F (3,68) = .53, p =.469, ηp2 = .01. The mean maximum
resulting acceleration value for participants in the Manual driving group was M = 24.71 (SD =
2.53) and the mean maximum steering wheel angle over time for participants in the Automated
driving group was M = 25.19 (SD = 3.03). There was no significant effect of warning condition
on maximum resulting acceleration with F (3,68) = 1.48, p = .229, ηp2 = .02. The mean maximum
resulting acceleration value for participants in the Semantic warning condition was M = 25.35
(SD = 2.95) and the mean maximum resulting acceleration value for participants in the NonSemantic condition was M = 24.55 (SD = 2.58). There was not a significant interaction between
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level of automation condition and warning condition for maximum resulting acceleration with F
(3,68) = .008, p = .929, ηp2 = .00.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The primary objective of this study was to determine if the level of automation used to
control the vehicle and the type of auditory warning, affected the driver’s response to novel
critical events. This was accomplished by comparing manual driving and automated driving and
providing either a semantic or non-semantic warning to the driver before the onset of the vehicle
hacking attempt that served as the novel critical event. The driver’s TTC, response method, the
amount of successful responses, and three measures of response quality were analyzed based
upon the level of automation and warning type that the driver was randomly assigned. The
results of the experiment suggest that level of automation may not affect how quickly people
respond to vehicle hacking attempts when the hacking attempt is preceded by an auditory
warning. In addition, the way participants responded to the hacking attempt and the amount of
successful responses to the hack, were very similar regardless of level of automation or warning
type. However, exploratory analyses provided some evidence that manual driving may lead to
safer responses to critical events as shown by the lower maximum steering wheel angles in the
manual driving condition. Additionally, exploratory analyses suggested that semantic warnings
are more often interpreted correctly overall and semantic warnings lead to higher reported
urgency, specifically when manually driving the vehicle.
Level of Automation: TTC
The first major manipulation used in the current study was the level of automation used
to control the vehicle. The current study hypothesized that level of automation would affect
participants TTC values such that participants in the manual driving condition would have higher
TTC values than participants in the automated driving condition (Hypothesis 1). The current
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experiment did not find a significant effect of level of automation on TTC, and as such, support
for Hypothesis 1 was not found. This finding is not consistent with previous research in the field.
The null findings for TTC, while not hypothesized, do partially coincide with the findings
of Merat et al. (2012) who also did not find a difference in how quickly participants responded
based upon automation level when no secondary task was present. The presence of a secondary
task has been shown to increase the SA deficit caused by the level of automation in the driving
domain by further distracting the driver from the primary task. The current study also did not
have a secondary task which may have been a reason why no TTC differences were found. When
no secondary task is present, it is possible that the level of SA is not sufficiently lowered in the
automated driving group to lead to significant differences in their responses to the hacking
attempt.
Past research by Gold et al. (2013) and Shen and Neyens (2017) both examined the effect
of manual and automated driving on participant responses to critical events similar to the current
experiment. They both found significant advantages, in terms of reaction time, for the manual
driving condition over the automated driving condition. In addition, when comparing semiautomated and highly automated driving, Strand et al. (2014) found faster reactions times for
participants in the semi automation condition than in the highly automated condition. The
researchers explained the results of these past experiments by positing that the faster reaction
times for drivers in the manual and lower automation conditions could be due to higher levels of
SA compared to the automated driving conditions.
For the current experiment, the TTC values were very similar for both levels of
automation which does not support our hypothesis or match past findings in the literature. The
lack of differences between the two levels of automation for TTC could suggest that there was
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not a difference in level of SA between manual and automated driving like there was in the past
studies by Gold et al. (2013), Strand et al. (2014), and Shen and Neyens (2017). This lack of a
difference in TTC and potentially SA, could be due to the auditory warning that was presented to
all participants before the hack began. By providing a warning beforehand, it is possible that
participants in each group had the duration of the warning (2 seconds) to gain SA, and as such,
members in both groups were prepared to respond to the critical event by the time it occurred. In
addition, Gold et al. (2013), Strand et al. (2014), and Shen and Neyens (2017) used more
traditional driving event scenarios such as braking for a vehicle in front or changing lanes to
avoid an upcoming obstacle as their critical event. These methodologies are different than the
complex and novel hacking scenario used in the current study.
In summary, the novelty of the vehicle hacking attempt used in the current study may
have led to the findings that are inconsistent with the results of Gold et al. (2013), Strand et al.
(2014), and Shen and Neyens (2017). The current finding suggests that the level of automation
present does not affect how quickly participants are able to respond to the critical event. This
inconsistency could be due to the lack of a secondary task, resulting in less differences in SA in
the current study, similar to Merat et al.’s. (2012) study. It could also be due to the addition of
the warning before the critical event, which possibly eliminated the SA differences between the
levels of automation. This may have led to a ceiling effect for TTC, such that all participants
responded to the critical event very quickly, eliminating the potential differences between the
driving groups. We did not find a significant difference between manual and automated driving
for TTC which is contrary to the previous literature, potentially due to the warning
implementation time and its effect on participants SA levels. Despite this, the benefit of

62
providing warnings before the actual critical event was highlighted as shown by the extremely
high TTC values found across all experimental groups.
Level of Automation: Successful Responses
The next goal of the study was to determine if the level of automation condition affected
the participants ability to successfully respond to the hacking attempt and safely resume control
of the vehicle. In order to examine this, the current study compared the amount of successful
responses to the hacking attempt between the manual and automated driving groups. In the
current experiment, participants in the manual driving group were expected to have more
successful responses than participants in the automated driving condition. Only three of the
seventy-two participants were able to successfully respond to the hacking attempt and all three
were in the automated driving condition. The statistical analysis did not find a significant
difference in successful responses between the two levels of automation. The current study did
not find significantly different numbers of successful responses to the vehicle hacking attempt in
the manual and automated driving conditions. Based on this finding, the current study did not
find support for Hypothesis 2.
Strand et al. (2014), in addition to other previous studies (Gold et al., 2013, & Shen and
Neyens, 2017) suggested that participants in the manual and semi-automated driving groups
would have more successful responses to the critical event than participants in the automated
driving group. The past authors attributed the higher amount of safe responses to the critical
event to higher levels of SA for those in semi-automated or manual driving. They suggested that
higher SA levels for participants was crucial for adequate responses and that higher automation
levels lead to participants that are more “out-of-the-loop”. These findings were not replicated in
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the current experiment possibly due to the potential lack of differences in SA shown by the very
similar TTC values for both level of automation conditions.
The overall low successful response rate across all participants (3 successful attempts in
72 critical events) suggests that the hacking scenario may have been too difficult for the
participants to safely respond, due to its novel and complex nature. The past studies by Gold et
al. (2013), Strand et al. (2014), and Shen and Neyens (2017) used simpler critical event scenarios
such as a lane change due to a stalled vehicle which may contribute to their significant results. In
contrast, they suggested the use of more complex and novel critical events for future research.
The hacking scenario used in the current study included vehicles and buildings in a cityscape and
the closeness of objects that needed to be avoided may have made the scenario too difficult for
participants to avoid while also attempting to combat the effects of the hacking attempt.
In summary, there was no significant difference for successful responses between the
two levels of automation which is not consistent with previous findings in the literature. This
finding suggests that the level of automation present does not affect the participants likelihood of
successfully responding to the critical event. Our null result is potentially due to the elevated
difficulty and complexity of the scenario and the hacking attempt as shown by the very low
number of successful responses as well as the elevated SA levels due to the early onset of the
warning.
Level of Automation: Response Method
Next, we wanted to determine if the level of automation led to different response methods
(wheel turns, pedal presses, etc.) to the vehicle hacking attempt critical event. We hypothesized
that participants in the manual driving condition would have different response methods than the
participants in the automated driving condition potentially due to a difference in SA between the
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two groups. It was expected that more pedal press responses would be found in the automated
condition as they brake to give themselves more time to gather information about the situation
and decide upon the correct method of response. The current study did not find significant
differences in respond method in the manual and automated driving conditions. Approximately
89% of all responses to the vehicle hacking critical event were wheel turns and there were equal
amounts of wheel turn and wheel turn/pedal press responses in the manual and automated driving
groups. Based on these findings, we did not find support for Hypothesis 3.
Past research by Gold and colleagues (2013) found that participants in the automated
driving group had slower reaction times due to lower levels of SA. Further, when the participants
had less time to react to the critical event due to their lower SA levels the participants were more
likely to use the brake than to use a wheel turn to steer the vehicle. Gold et al. posited that this
tendency to brake rather than to steer as a first reaction was likely an attempt by the participants
to give themselves more time to gather SA about the critical event and their surroundings before
making the decision of how to appropriately respond. This explanation and accompanied results
were not found in the current experiment, potentially due to a lack of differences in SA between
the manual and automated driving conditions in the current study.
There are a couple of potential reasons for the inconsistency with Gold and colleague’s
study and the current experiment’s null result. Implementing the warning before the hacking
attempt potentially led to higher levels of SA across both levels of automation and provided a
window of time for the participant to attend to the vehicle and analyze the situation before the
hacking attempt actually began. This could explain why the participants used a wheel turn as a
first response rather than a brake press since they may not have needed to create additional extra
time to analyze their situation. The potentially higher SA levels across both levels of automation
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could also have led to the participants typically using a wheel turn as their response method to
the hacking attempt.
Another potential reason for the null result was the way the hacking attempt was
implemented. The hacking attempt itself caused the vehicle to change direction and veer off the
road. Had the hacking attempt required the vehicle to avoid an object directly in front of them it
is possible they would have been more likely to use the brake as found in Gold et al.’s (2013)
study. In essence, the way that the hack occurred, and its change of direction may have been the
reason why the participant predominately used a wheel turn to combat the direction change
rather than a brake press.
In sum, there was no significant difference in response method between the manual and
automated driving groups. This result suggests that the level of automation present does not
affect the way drivers respond to critical events. This result is not consistent with past findings or
the theory of SA (Endsley, 1995). The lack of a difference between the two groups is potentially
due to elevated SA levels for both groups due to the preemptive warning and the nature of the
hacking attempt. Further research in needed into this domain as the complexity of the current
experiment may have led to results that are not indicative of all driving situations.
Warning Type
In addition to level of automation, the current study also manipulated the content of the
auditory warning that each participant received. The warnings contained either a tone or a
semantic statement and we aimed to determine if the semantic content within a warning affected
the participants responses to the vehicle hacking attempt. It was hypothesized that participants in
the semantic warning condition would have higher TTC values than participants in the nonsemantic warning condition. This expectation was based upon the idea that warning type would
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affect participant’s responses such that semantic warnings would elevate the participants SA by
informing them of the cause of the warning resulting in better warning responses. The current
study did not find significantly different TTC values between the semantic and non-semantic
warning suggesting that the semantic warning did not provide additional benefit over the nonsemantic warnings. Based on this result, the current study was not able to support Hypothesis 4.
Past research that examined whether the content of a warning affected responses
produced results not replicated in the current study. For instance, Politis et al. (2015) found that
when auditory warnings were used, language-based warning recipients had faster reaction times
than abstract tone-based warning recipients. Also, Baldwin and May (2005) suggested that verbal
auditory warnings have the potential to reduce crash risk during hazardous situations. Chang et
al. (2008) also posited that warnings that included speech are beneficial to the driver when they
need to avoid a crash. Chang and colleagues suggested that the extra information provided by the
semantic warning over the non-semantic warning would lead to better SA for the driver. These
findings and others, (Hellier et al., 2002; McKeown & Isherwood, 2007) were the basis for the
current studies expectations of different TTC values between the groups due differences in SA
provided by the warnings. However, the current study did not replicate the findings of these
studies as shown by nearly identical TTC values for participants in both the semantic and nonsemantic warning conditions.
The results found in the current study, that do not match these previous studies, are
potentially the result of a few experimental design differences. Past research on auditory
warnings has focused on after-the-fact reported urgency and pleasantness ratings, whereas the
current study attempted to see if the warning type produced tangible differences in how drivers
responded to a novel and complex driving event. This complicated and potentially less warning
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centric design may have resulted in similar levels of SA for the drivers. It is possible that the null
result of the current study is due to similarities between the warnings which were matched based
upon volume and length, but control and experimental conditions are often matched as closely as
possible so that any differences can be attributed to the one aspect that is different.
An additional possible cause of the null result is that the warnings were provided before
the hacking attempt occurred and both warnings lead to sufficient boosts in SA for the
participant to quickly respond to the hacking attempt. If drivers in both warning groups were
warned ahead of time for an extended period, such as in this experiment, it may have led to
sufficient time for the driver to gather SA in time to respond to the hacking attempt. This
suggestion is supported by the very high mean TTC scores for both warning groups that were
found in this study. In hindsight, presenting the warnings simultaneously with the hacking
attempt may have provided a scenario wherein the semantic value of the warning had an effect
because the participants would not already be at higher SA levels before the hacking attempt
even began.
In conclusion, there was no significant difference for TTC between the semantic and nonsemantic warnings. This finding suggests that the content of the warning does not affect the
driver’s ability to respond quickly to the warning, but these results are not in accordance with the
theoretical and experimental findings in the warning and SA literature. This null result is
possibly due to the similarity between the warnings and the fact that both warnings were
provided before the hacking attempt occurred. The early implementation of the warnings may
have elevated the participants SA levels sufficiently enough to lead to the overall large TTC
values for both groups and masking the potential benefit of the semantic content that was found
in past research.
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Level of Automation and Warning Content
Our final hypothesis pertained to the potential interaction between warning type and level
of automation such that the addition of the semantic warning in the manual driving condition
would have less of a benefit for TTC values than the addition of the semantic warning in the
automated driving condition. It was expected that the addition of semantic information would not
benefit the manual group as much due to the manual drivers elevated SA levels, but it would
benefit automated drivers who were more “out-of-the-loop” and had lower SA levels. The
current experiment did not find a significant interaction between level of automation and
warning conditions for TTC. As a result, we were unable to provide support for Hypothesis 5.
Previous research by Chang et al. (2008) proposed that the benefit of the semantic
warning was due to the additional increase in SA that the extra content provided. The expectation
that the SA change was the driving factor for the benefit of the semantic content is an important
factor that can be found in the level of automation literature as well. Gold et al. (2013) proposed
that the faster TTC values they found for the manual group were due to increased levels of SA
for participants that were manually controlling the vehicle. If manual driving is predicted to lead
to higher levels of SA than automated driving, it stands to reason that the SA benefit of the
semantic warning may not be as beneficial for manual drivers due to their already elevated SA
when compared to the automated driving group. However, the hypothesized interaction was not
found in the results of the current study.
The results of the current experiment did not show a significant interaction between the
level of automation condition and warning condition as was hypothesized and predicted based on
previous research. This null result is potentially due to the fact that the manual and automated
driving groups were not different based on TTC or response method suggesting similar levels of
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SA for both levels of automation. In addition, there was no significant difference between the
semantic and non-semantic warning conditions for TTC which suggests that both warnings
provided sufficient boosts to SA prior to the hacking attempt which led to the high collected TTC
values for response from both warning groups. If there was no benefit of manual driving that
lead to higher SA levels and no benefit of semantic warning that lead to higher SA levels, then
the expectation of a significant interaction between the two IVs is far less likely. It is also
possible that by providing the warnings before the hacking attempt the participants were able to
reach such elevated levels of SA that neither IV was able to significantly benefit one group over
the other.
In summary, Hypothesis 5 regarding an interaction between level of automation and
warning condition was not supported. This suggests that level of automation and warning type
are not related but this finding is not in line with the theoretical and experimental findings in the
related literature. This null finding is possibly due to a lack of main effects for each IV and the
ceiling effect caused by the preemptive implementation of both warning types. Further research
on how level of automation and warning type are related to one another is needed to bridge the
gap between the warning and level of automation literature. This future research is of extra
importance to transportation researchers, due to the high prevalence of auditory warning usage in
the driving domain.
Reported Engagement
The first item on the post experiment survey given to the participants asked participants
to rate their agreement with a statement suggesting that they were engaged in driving or
monitoring the vehicle for the entire ride. The results showed no difference across the groups.
This finding suggests that participants in each group reported that they were engaged in the
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drive/ride similarly regardless of level of automation and warning content. This finding also
provides support that the random assignment used during the experiments worked sufficiently. In
conclusion, participants reported being engaged regardless of experimental group.
Reported Warning Realization
The second item on the post experiment survey asked all participants if they noticed a
warning during the drive and participants responded with a yes or no response. We did not find a
significant difference in the number of participants who reported noticing the warning based
upon the level of automation they were assigned. This null result suggests that noticing warnings
is not affected by whether manual or automated driving is in use when the warning is
implemented but this null finding may also be due to Type 1 error. However, we did find a
significant effect of warning type on the number of participants who reported noticing the
warning. Specifically, participants who received the non-semantic warning reported not noticing
a warning more frequently than participants who received the semantic warning. This finding
suggests that semantic warnings are superior if recognizing an auditory input as a warning is the
goal. Based on this finding, we suggest that semantic warnings should be used when attempting
to warn a participant about an upcoming critical event regardless of the vehicle’s level of
automation. Using semantic warnings to warn participants of incoming critical events may
increase the likelihood that individuals recognize the warning as a warning and respond to it
rather than attributing the warning to ambient noise and ignoring the warning.
Reported Warning Interpretation
The third item on the post experiment survey asked the participants that did report
noticing the warning what they interpreted the warning to represent. It was a multiple-choice
question and the correct answer was a vehicle hacking attempt and all other responses were
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scored as not a vehicle hacking attempt. Understanding what the warning represents is essential
to making the appropriate response in many cases and those who received semantic warnings
appeared better at determining what the warning meant based on their self-report responses.
There was no significant effect of level of automation on the number of correct interpretations of
the warning, suggesting that warnings are interpreted regardless of the level of automation used
in the vehicle. However, there was a significant effect of warning condition on the interpretation
of the warning. Those who received the semantic warning were more likely to correctly interpret
the warning as caused by a vehicle hacking attempt. This finding may potentially be due to the
inclusion of what the warning represents in the semantic warning, but that is exactly what the
addition of semantic content is supposed to provide.
The large number of incorrect interpretations of the warnings as system malfunctions or
other issues may have influenced how quickly and successfully participants responded to the
hacking attempt critical event. Had participants effectively interpreted the warnings as hacking
attempt warnings, the urgency, method, and success of their responses may have changed or
improved. In conclusion, the participants did not accurately interpret the cause of the warning,
most of the time, and this inconsistency may have affected the way participants responded to the
warnings across all aspects of the study. In summary, the level of automation present did not
affect the interpretation of the warning, but the warning type received did. This finding suggests
that semantic warnings are more often correctly identified than non-semantic warnings. Based on
this, we suggest that semantic warnings should be used when the warning represents a novel or
complex issue such as a vehicle hacking attempt. The additional information in semantic
warnings may be of added benefit when novel situations occur. Any extra information about
never experienced scenarios while driving may lead to better responses and more avoided
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accidents compared to generic auditory warnings that do not provide any context for the
incoming critical event. More research on the effect of warning condition is needed to further
explore these findings and provide additional advice for vehicle system development.
Reported Warning Urgency
Participants that responded that they noticed the warning on the previous question in the
post experiment survey were also asked to give their level of agreement that the warning they
received was urgent. The current study did not find a significant effect of level of automation on
the reported urgency level of the received warning consistent with behavioral data. In contrast,
the current study did find a significant effect of warning type on the reported urgency level of the
received warning and a significant interaction between level of automation and warning type.
Hellier et al. (2002) proposed that warnings that contained speech/semantic information
were more capable of expressing the urgency of the warning because the warning potentially
includes a description of what the warning represents. Hellier et al.’s theory was partially
supported in the current study by the significantly lower urgency rating for the non-semantic
warning in the manual driving group. However, Hellier and colleagues’ theory was not supported
in the automated driving condition where the urgency ratings of both the semantic and nonsemantic warnings were not significantly different.
Based on the self-report data from participants in the manual driving group, the semantic
warnings were rated as urgent more frequently than the non-semantic warnings. The current
results support this finding, suggesting that the semantic content within the auditory warning
may lead to higher levels of perceived urgency compared to non-semantic warnings depending
on the level of automation in use. In the current experiment, the implementation of a semantic
warning lead to more urgent ratings when manual driving was in use, but not when automated
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driving was in use. This may suggest that semantic warnings are only beneficial in manual
driving or that warnings are interpreted differently when automated driving is used. Further
research is needed to understand how level of automation and warning type affect warning
urgency in the driving domain.
Reported Knowledge of Vehicle Hacking
Another major question given to all participants in the experiment pertained to whether or
not the participant was previously aware of the potential for vehicle hacking and the participants
responded with a yes or no answer. Of the seventy-two participants that received the question,
less than 20% had previously heard of vehicle hacking. This suggests that vehicle hacking is not
an issue that most people may be aware of. This finding accords with McManus et al.’s (2018)
finding wherein most of the participants were unaware of the potential for vehicle hacking unless
told otherwise.
Next, the participants were asked whether they were more concerned with automated
vehicle hacking, technical based automation failure, both, or neither. For participants in the
manual and automated driving groups, most participants reported that they were concerned with
both, but technical automation failure was the next most prevalent answer. The self-report data
pertaining to concern suggest that while most participants had not heard of vehicle hacking
previously, that it is of similar concern to technical automation failure. This result may be due to
their recent experience with a simulated vehicle hacking attempt. While not conclusive, these
results suggest that when participants are aware of the potential for vehicle hacking attempts it is
an important concern they have with automated driving in the future.
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Level of Automation and Maximum Steering Wheel Angle
In addition to the planned dependent variables, multiple exploratory measures of hacking
attempt response quality were also collected. The first measure of response quality that was
analyzed was maximum steering wheel angle (Shen & Neyens, 2017). The current study found a
significant effect of level of automation on maximum steering wheel angle. Specifically,
participants in the manual driving group had significantly smaller maximum steering wheel angle
values than participants in the automated driving group. This finding suggests that the responses
to the critical event were more severe when in the automated driving group than in the manual
driving group.
The benefit of manual driving for maximum steering wheel angle may be due to a couple
of reasons. For instance, the participants in the manual driving group had larger amount of
previous experience with the simulator steering wheel even though participants in both groups
were required to spend five minutes manually driving the vehicle in the practice portion of the
experiment. In juxtaposition, it may be due to higher levels of SA for manual drivers.
Regardless, this finding is consistent with the previous finding by Shen and Neyens (2017) and
provides additional evidence that responses to critical events may be less severe for manual
drivers than automated drivers. In conclusion, participants in the manual driving group had less
severe responses to the vehicle hacking attempt based on maximum steering wheel angle. This
finding is potentially due to past experience with the steering wheel or boosted levels of SA for
manual drivers. Based on this finding we suggest that manual driving be used when vehicle
hacking attempts are imminent in order to minimize the maximum steering wheel angle achieved
when responding to a vehicle hacking attempt.
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Warning Condition and Maximum Steering Wheel Angle
In addition to level of automation, maximum steering wheel angle was also exploratorily
examined across warning condition. The results of the experiment showed an effect of warning
condition that approached significance.
Though the effect only approached significance, semantic warning recipients had larger
maximum steering wheel angles, potentially due to their understanding of the urgency of the
situation. This suggestion is supported by the difference in how many people correctly identified
the warning they received as a warning. Far less participants in the non-semantic warning
condition reported that they received a warning at all. The higher frequency of understanding the
warning and the recognition of its presence and urgency may have led to the more severe
maximum steering wheel turn values for the semantic condition. This effect, that approached
significance, may have been amplified by the participants lack of familiarity with the potential
for vehicle hacking attempts.
Further research is needed to determine the effect of warning type on the safety of critical
event response in order for recommendations to be made. Additional measures of response
quality would provide further information about the quality of participant responses and provide
further insight into how warnings affect driver’s response quality.
Maximum Steering Wheel Angle Over Time
In addition to maximum steering wheel angle, we examined maximum steering wheel
angle over time. This measure may provide additional insight by incorporating how quickly the
maximum wheel turn was performed with lower times suggesting more severe turns and
potentially more dangerous driving. The current experiment did not produce a significant
difference in maximum steering wheel angle over time between manual and automated driving.
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The current experiment also did not find a significant difference for maximum steering wheel
angle over time between the warning conditions. These null results are potentially due to the
consistent seven second time from the onset of the warning until the end of the hack that resulted
in a crash for the participants the vast majority of the time. In conclusion, there were no
significant effects of warning type or level of automation conditions for maximum steering
wheel turn over time which is potentially due to the relatively short time window for response of
seven seconds. This finding may suggest that maximum steering wheel angle over time is not as
useful as other measures of response quality, but further research using this dependent variable is
needed to make that determination.
Maximum Resulting Acceleration
Maximum resulting acceleration is a measure of response quality calculated by using the
lateral and longitudinal accelerations of the vehicle. The current experiment did not find a
significant difference for maximum resulting acceleration due to level of automation. Maximum
resulting acceleration was examined by Gold and colleagues (2013) and Shen and Neyens (2017)
with varying results. Gold et al. (2013) found a significant effect of advanced warning time (5
seconds vs 7 seconds) for maximum resulting acceleration but did not find a significant
difference between the manual and automated driving groups.
The current experiment did not produce a significant difference in maximum resulting
acceleration between manual and automated driving. This is consistent with the result of Gold et
al. (2013) who also did not find an effect of level of automation for maximum resulting
acceleration. The current study did not measure maximum resulting acceleration at multiple
points and used the largest maximum resulting acceleration for each participant which prevented
direct comparison to the Shen and Neyens (2017) study.
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The current experiment did not produce a significant difference in maximum resulting
acceleration between the semantic and non-semantic warning conditions. It was not expected that
there would be a significant difference for semantic and non-semantic warning based on the
previous literature, but it was exploratorily analyzed since there was a significant effect for a
warning related variable in the Gold et al. (2013) study. In conclusion, maximum resulting
acceleration was not significantly affected by driving or warning condition in the current
experiment which is neither consistent nor inconsistent with the past literature due to the varying
results found in past experiments for maximum resulting acceleration.
Theoretical Implications
The level of automation and warning literatures contain numerous studies with differing
interpretations of how the level of automation and warnings present in the vehicle affects
participants responses to critical events. The current study sought to further explore this concept
by manipulating the level of automation and warning type and implementing a novel and more
difficult critical event scenario. The implementation of a novel and complex critical event was
determined based on suggestions from previous literature and the growing potential for vehicle
hacking. The results of the study suggest that level of automation and warning type do not
significantly affect the method of response, number of successful responses, or TTC of the
participants. The current study’s findings are in accordance with some past findings but not with
others. This suggests that the effect level of automation and warning type have in critical events
scenarios may vary depending on specific aspects of the critical event. The lack of consistent
findings in this domain, including the current study, suggests that a clear theoretical
understanding of how level of automation and warning type affect responses to critical events
may not be present.
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Past research has suggested that the theory of SA can be used to explain the differences
due to level of automation and warning type and SA was the basis for the current study’s
expected results. SA was expected to be different based on the level of automation and warning
used at the time of the critical event, but due to the current study not measuring SA, direct
interpretations cannot be made. Future studies should include direct measures of SA in order to
further understand the theoretical implication that level of automation and warning type have on
SA in surface transportation. While SA was not directly measured in the current study, the
results of the experiment may suggest that SA changes due to level of automation are not present
during emergency response scenarios such as the vehicle hacking attempt used in the current
study. If emergency scenarios result in SA not accurately explaining how participants responded,
then further theory may be needed to explain participant responses in emergency scenarios.
In addition, the literature is unclear how warning type and level of automation affect SA
when used simultaneously in response to a critical event. The current study found that early
auditory warning implementation may have mitigated the potential difference in SA due to the
level of automation present by capturing the participant’s attention before the critical event. This
led to very quick responses to the impending vehicle hacking attempt regardless of the level of
automation in use. If preemptive auditory warnings lead to fast responses to the critical event,
then the SA difference due to level of automation may be mitigated because the participant is
already attending to their environment and are prepared to respond thanks to the preemptive
warning they received. Further research is needed to understand how SA is affected by level of
automation and warning type. When the warning is implemented may need to be accounted for
in future research. SA is a complex concept and direct measurement of SA is needed in future
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studies to make clear interpretations of how different warning characteristics and levels of
automation affect individuals SA during critical events.
Design Implications
The results of the current experiment were sporadic, and at times, not consistent with the
level of automation, situation awareness, and warning literature in the surface transportation
domain. Many of the expected differences were not found partly as a result of very large TTC
values and a limited number of successful responses. Despite this, useful information can be
gleaned in order to make suggestions for the design of future vehicle automation and warning
systems. Firstly, the results of the experiment suggest that warnings given prior to the onset of
the critical event lead to very high TTC values regardless of warning type or level of automation.
Based on this finding, it may be beneficial to provide warnings in advance of the critical event
when possible. Secondly, semantic warnings were found to be identified as warnings
significantly more frequently than non-semantic warnings. Based on this finding, we suggest that
semantic warnings should be used when auditory warnings are used to inform the driver that a
critical event is about to occur. In addition, there was a benefit of semantic warnings when
participants were asked to identify the cause of the warning. We suggest that when novel critical
events, such as vehicle hacking attempts, are possible, semantic warnings should be used so the
driver is more likely to appropriately diagnose the cause of the warning. When critical event
response quality was measured using maximum steering wheel angle, we found a benefit of
manual driving. Based on this finding, we suggest that manual driving should be implemented
when complex vehicle responses are needed from the driver. In conclusion, multiple of the
results from the current study suggest that manual driving and semantic warnings may be
preferable when drivers need to respond to complex critical events, like vehicle hacking
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attempts. These findings should be taken into account when designing future warning and
automation systems.
Study Limitations
The current experiment did not provide many of the expected significant differences that
were predicted by the researcher’s hypotheses and the previous literature. One major potential
reason for this was the implementation of the warnings before the hack occurred which led to a
ceiling effect and very high TTC values for all participants. Three of the experiments hypotheses
pertained to TTC so the elevated TTC values across the board potentially led to the null results.
The use of a low fidelity driving simulator could also have affected the results due to less tactile
feedback pertaining to their control inputs and their effect on the vehicle compared to actual
vehicles. Additionally, simulator use may have resulted in less actual perceived urgency and
concern than in an actual vehicle due to a lack of genuine danger resulting from the vehicle
hacking attempt.
There were also different amounts of participant in our experimental groups who reported
previous knowledge of vehicle hacking. Those who were aware of vehicle hacking previously
may have different responses than those who hadn’t and the unequal distribution across
experimental groups is a limitation of the study. The sample was also heavily female and African
American and, as such, may not have been representative of the overall driving population. The
study was also limited by the age of the participants who were all between the ages of 18-23
years old and as such does not accurately depict the overall driving population.
The novelty of vehicle hacking may also have played a part since most of the participants
had never heard of vehicle hacking before the study. The fact that the participants likely never
experienced any driving situation like this and its lack of similarities to past studies is a potential
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explanation for why the results of the current study did not match the previous literature or our
hypotheses. Lastly, and potentially most importantly, the hacking attempt scenario presented to
the drivers was difficult due to the complexity of the surrounding environment and the short time
period given to the participants to maneuver through them. This may have led to the majority of
participants failing to successfully respond to the hacking attempt despite the high TTC values
found across all experimental groups.
Future Directions
The use of automation and warning in vehicles and the prevalence of vehicle hacking
attempts are likely to continue to increase. Future research on level of automation and warning
implementation can learn from this study’s findings. Future studies may consider using a
multiple vehicle hacking attempts and more diverse automation levels. The type of hacking
attempt and its complexity is also a factor that could potentially be manipulated. Different
warning types such as tactile warnings could be compared to auditory warnings and measures of
urgency and pleasantness could be implemented. Importantly, the warning implementation time
could also be manipulated such that warnings are implemented as the hacking attempt begins and
compared to preemptive warnings like those used in this study. In addition, different driving
populations and higher fidelity simulators may provide further insight to how level of automation
and warning type affect driver responses to novel vehicle hacking attempts.

82
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The current experiment attempted to examine whether the level of automation and the
content of the warning effected participants responses to a complex and novel take over response
scenario in the form of a vehicle hacking attempt. The current results indicate that there was no
significant effect of level of automation condition or warning condition on TTC values,
successful response rate, or reaction method. These findings are contrary to the previous
literature and are potentially due to various factors of the experimental scenario such as warning
implementation time and hacking scenario complexity. Despite null results for the hypothesized
analyses, multiple analyses found significant benefits for manual driving and semantic warnings
as well as a significant interaction between level of automation and warning type for reported
urgency. Additionally, preemptive warning implementation resulted in very high TTC values
across the board suggesting warnings implemented prior to the critical event may result in quick
responses to the warning. Further research is needed to clarify how level of automation and
warning type interact and affect how participants respond to vehicle hacking attempts. However,
the current study provides evidence that suggests manual driving and semantic warnings can be
beneficial for warning interpretation and response quality when responding to a complex and
novel critical event like a vehicle hacking attempt.
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APPENDIX A
POWER ANALYSIS RESULTS

The power analysis (shown in the graph above) indicates that to achieve a statistical power of
.80, 72 participants were needed with 18 in each group.
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APPENDIX B
STIMULI AND APPARATUS SETUP
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Appendix C
DEMOGRAPHICS FORM
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APPENDIX D
DRIVER EXPERIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE (ADAPTED FROM KYRIAKIDIS,
HAPPEE, & DE WINTER, 2015)
1. What is your primary mode of transportation?
1 Private Vehicle
2 Public Transportation
3 Motorcycle
4 Walking/cycling
5 Other
2. At what age did you receive your first driver’s license?
3. On average, how frequently did you drive a vehicle in the last 12 months?
1 Never
2 Rarely
3 Sometimes
4 Often
5 Everyday
4. Do you drive a vehicle to school or work?
Yes
No
5. About how many miles did you drive in the last 12 months? Please tell us in the box
below.
6. How many accidents were you involved in in the last three years? Please tell us in the box
below.
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APPENDIX E
PARTICIPANT EXPERIMENTAL OPINION SURVEY
1. You were engaged in monitoring the automated driving system for the entire ride.
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree
3 Neither Agree or Disagree
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree
2. Did you notice a warning during the drive?
Yes
No
3. You perceived the warning you received to be urgent.
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree
3 Neither Agree or Disagree
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree
4. What did the warning you received mean? Please explain in the text box provided.
5. What did the warning you received represent?
A. A system malfunction
B. An automation failure
C. A vehicle hacking attempt
D. Low fuel level
6. What do you think the purpose of the study was? Please explain in the text box provided.
7. Were you aware of the potential for vehicle hacking before the experiment?
Yes
No
8. Are you concerned with automated vehicle hacking more or less than automation failure
due to technical failure in the surface transportation domain?
I am more concerned with automated vehicle hacking.
I am more concerned with automation failure.
Not concerned with either
9. What are your major concerns with automation in cars? Please list them in the text box
provided.
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